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Abstract
This paper describes subjective wage inequality and the demand for redistribution in Aus-
tria using individuals’ estimates of occupational wages from the International Social Survey
Program. Although these estimates differ widely across individuals, the data clearly show
that most individuals would like to decrease wage inequality, relative to the level of in-
equality which they perceive to exist. The empirical analysis also shows that the demand
for redistribution is strongly associated not only with variables describing self-interested
motives for redistribution, but also with perceptions of and social norms with respect to
inequality. Further, the demand for redistribution is a strong predictor for whether an
individual is supportive of redistribution by the state. On the other hand, however, I find
almost no evidence for an empirical association between the demand for redistribution and
individuals’ party identification.
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1 Introduction
In the mid-2000s, overall public cash benefits accounted for almost 16 percent of disposable
household income of the average individual in working age in the OECD. The tax burden, at
the same time, amounted to about 31 percent of disposable household income (OECD, 2008).
These few numbers make it clear that, typically, governments exert substantial influence on
the distribution of market income through the collection of taxes and the provision of transfer
payments. This holds also true for Austria, which will be the focus of the empirical part of
this paper: the corresponding figures are 27.4 and 24.8 percent, respectively. Starting from the
premise that political outcomes, such as the factual amount of redistribution, must somehow
relate to individuals’ preferences over redistribution (e.g. Borck, 2007), the question comes up
whether and to what extent the actual amount of redistribution mirrors individuals’ perceptions
of wage inequality as well as their normative beliefs as regards the just distribution of wages,
and how these perceptions and beliefs translate into the political and economic outcomes.
Indeed, recent theoretical work in economics has convincingly pushed the idea that the
amount of redistribution is linked to individuals’ attitudes towards distributive justice (Alesina
and Angeletos, 2005) and to individuals’ perception of whether differences in earnings are pri-
marily due to either luck or due to individual effort (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006), respectively.
Such theoretical arguments are supported by some interesting empirical evidence on the as-
sumed link between social norms and beliefs on the one hand and economic and political
outcomes on the other hand. For example, Di Tella et al. (2007) analyze a situation which
randomly granted legal land titles to some land squatters near Buenos Aires, but not to some
others. Their analysis shows that those squatters who were given legal land titles developed
more materialist and individualistic beliefs; beliefs that are commonly thought to be conducive
to the functioning of a market economy. A recent paper by Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009)
even shows that individuals who grow up during a recession have different beliefs than individ-
uals growing up in an economic boom. The reverse channel, running from norms to outcomes,
has been studied in Stutzer and Lalive (2004). They use regional variation in a national refer-
endum on the level of unemployment benefits in Switzerland as a measure for the norm not to
work off public benefits. Their analysis shows that the social norm to work has a significant
impact on average unemployment duration.
Most of the available empirical evidence on the issue, however, rather focuses on the de-
terminants of individuals’ demand for redistribution and their support for the welfare state
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Corneo and Gru¨ner, 2002; Fong,
2001). These studies typically find that attitudes towards the welfare state and individuals’
perceptions of which factors determine one’s income are all associated with the demand for
redistribution. For example, people who think that luck is an important determinant of income
tend to be more in favor of redistribution. A second typical finding is that income by itself
appears to be a surprisingly poor predictor of the demand for redistribution, given its promi-
nent role in the economic literature (e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981). In an interesting take
on the issue Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007) additionally stress the role of the prevailing
2
economic and political institutions on individual preferences, comparing individuals’ attitudes
from former East and West Germany. They find that East Germans are much more supportive
of the state than West Germans and that it will take a couple of generations until attitudes
will converge between the two regions.
This abundance of empirical evidence on the determinants of the demand for redistribu-
tion notwithstanding, and even though it seems an obvious thing to link people’s preferences
over redistribution with their party identification, evidence on the hypothesized link between
attitudes and norms on the one hand and political outcomes on the other hand is scarce.1
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) provide some tentative empirical evidence on the relation be-
tween the belief that luck determines income and individuals’ political orientation, i.e. they
show that individuals who believe that luck determines income tend to be found left on the
political spectrum. Guiso et al. (2006) make the connection between preferences and political
outcomes explicit, showing that the actual amount of redistribution and preferences are in-
deed related to each other. Kuhn (2009) finds indirect evidence for the link between people’s
attitudes and political outcomes in Switzerland, showing quite a strong empirical association
between various subjective inequality measures and individuals’ support for redistribution by
the state. Moreover, he finds a substantial impact of these inequality measures on individuals’
party identification.
In this paper, I will use a simple and intuitive conceptual framework to measure inequality
from an individual’s subjective point of view and to study the association between subjective
inequality measures and individuals’ support for the welfare state and individuals’ stated party
preferences, respectively, using survey data from Austria. Austria is, inter alia, an interesting
country for further inquiry because it belongs to the group of countries with lowest inequality in
disposable household income.2 At the same time, however, the effectiveness of the redistributive
system is judged to be rather low, probably mainly due to the fact that public transfers are
comparatively only weakly targeted. Consequently, the reduction in inequality due to transfers
and taxes is comparatively low in Austria, relative to the amount of resources that is involved
(OECD, 2008). The conceptual framework yields various measures that are able to describe
both the perception of actual wage inequality and the normative assessment of the desired wage
inequality at the individual level, given appropriate data on individuals’ subjective estimates
of occupational wages. This also leads me to a very natural conceptualization of the demand
for redistribution. In the main part of the empirical analysis I will first check how several
potential motives for redistribution relate to these measures. Specifically, I will focus on
economic incentives on the one hand and perceptions and norms with respect to distributive
1There is some related evidence from political science. First, there is aggregate evidence showing that welfare
retrenchment is associated with partisan politics (Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Korpi and Palme, 2003). At the
individual level, there is research showing that individuals’ preferences over political issues are associated with
party identification (Carsey and Layman, 2006; Goren, 2005).
2Inequality in market income in Austria is lower than in most other OECD countries to start with (OECD,
2008). This most likely relates to the high degree of centralization of wage bargaining in Austria (e.g. Wallerstein
et al., 1997). The structure of wage bargaining also fits the observation that relative wage structures seem to
be rather rigid (Hofer et al., 2001) and wage mobility to be comparatively low (Hofer and Weber, 2002).
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justice on the other hand. Second, in order to provide some tentative empirical evidence on the
link between attitudes and political outcomes, I study whether these subjective measures are
associated with individuals’ support for the welfare state (i.e. for redistribution by the state).
Finally, I also check whether these measures are associated with individuals’ stated party
identification, which would again reflect the hypothesized link between norms and desired
political outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shortly describes the data
source. Special emphasis is given to individuals’ estimates of occupational wages available in
these data. In section 3, I will discuss a simple framework suitable for the analysis of subjective
inequality measures and the demand for redistribution. Section 4 presents descriptive evidence
on these various measures. The main empirical results are presented and discussed in section
5. Section 5.1 looks at whether the observed variation in these measures is linked to different
motives behind redistribution. Section 5.2 explores the link between subjective measures of
inequality and redistribution and individuals’ support of redistribution by the state. Section
5.3 looks at whether those different measures can explain individuals’ party preference. Section
6 concludes.
2 Data
I use data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), an annual survey program
aimed at establishing internationally comparable data on several key themse as religion, the
role of government and social inequality, inter alia. The ISSP organized its first survey focusing
on social inequality in 1987 and a second and a third survey followed in the years 1992 and
1999, respectively (a fourth survey is scheduled for 2009). Although Austria took part in
all three surveys, the data on occupational wage estimates that are key for the conceptual
framework are not available in the 1992 survey. Because there have also been some changes to
the key over time I will focus exclusively on the data from 1999.
2.1 Subjective Estimates of Occupational Wages
The variables that are key for the subsequent empirical analysis are individuals’ subjective
estimates of the wages of people working in different occupations. Specifically, individuals were
asked to estimate what they thought that people working in nine different occupations and
their coworkers actually earn and ought to earn (before taxes and social security contributions),
respectively (see also appendix A which contains the exact wording of the questions and the
list of occupations).
Table 1
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for these wage estimates.3 According to table 1, for
example, individuals perceive the gross monthly wage of a shop assistant to be about e 1,650 on
3The original wage estimates in the survey are given in units of the former Austrian currency, the Austrian
Schilling. To simplify the reading of the table I have converted all numbers into Euros, using the exchange
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average, while they on average think that a shop assistant should earn about e 1,890 a month,
yielding a difference between desired and perceived wage of about e 300 per month. Note
that the real wage of a shop assistant is not the focus of this study because misperceptions of
factual wage rates are one important reason why people might demand (different amounts of)
redistribution. In the case of a lawyer, by way of comparison, the average perceived monthly
wage (about e 7,890) is considerably higher than what the average person would judge as
appropriate (about e 5,940 only).
Figure 1
Figure 1 plots the average estimates of actual and desired wages for each occupation to
make the main features of these estimates more visible. First, people seem to accept rather
large differences in wages across occupations on average as there is a very clear-cut ranking
of the occupations not only with respect to actual wages, but also with respect to desired
wages. Moreover, note also that the ranking of the occupations as regards their just wages
is exactly the same as the ranking with respect to their actual wages. Thus people not only
think that a lawyer actually earns more than a shop assistant, they also tend to think that
a lawyer ought to earn more than a shop assistant. Second, average estimates for actual and
desired wages differ considerably from each other within each occupation. However, they do
so to a very different degree. For example, the average ethical wage estimate is higher than
the actual wage estimate in the case of the shop assistant, while the reverse holds true for the
lawyer. Third, leaving coworkers’ wages aside, there is a dichotomous grouping of the nine
remaining occupations, based on both their average wage estimates but also on the difference
between the average actual and the average desired level of pay. Specifically, there are three
occupations (i.e. unskilled worker, shop assistant and skilled worker) for whom both perceived
and desired wages are comparatively low and desired wages are higher than perceived wages on
average. The reverse holds true for the remaining six occupations. Coworkers’ wage estimates
fall right in between these two groups and, therefore, coworkers somehow represent the average
occupation in a random sample of workers.
Two additional remarks relate to the variation in individuals’ wage estimates (see table
1 again). First, note that the variation in wage estimates is larger for those occupations
which have higher estimated wages on average. At the same time, these are the very same
occupations for which the desired wage estimate is lower than the perceived wage estimate
on average. Second, the comparison between actual and perceived wage estimates within
occupations shows that, for the group of lower skilled occupations, the dispersion of estimates
is higher with respect to ethical than to actual wages. Interestingly, the reverse holds true for
the higher skilled occupations. For this second group of occupations, the distribution of desired
wage estimates is clearly less spread out than the distribution of perceived wage estimates.
rate at which the Austrian Schilling was replaced by the Euro (1 e= 13.7603 ATS). Since almost all of the
subsequent analysis is based on relative comparisons, the exact choice of exchange rate does not matter on
substantial grounds.
5
3 Conceptual Framework
This section discusses shortly the building blocks of a simple conceptual framework suitable
for describing subjective wage inequality and the demand for redistribution. The framework
is borrowed from and discussed in more detail in Kuhn (2009). The framework is based on
individuals’ occupational wage estimates that have been discussed in the preceding section
and rests on a simple analogy between the measurement of objective and subjective wage
inequality. The second key feature of the framework is that the data allow me to distinguish
between individuals’ perception of the wage inequality and their assessment of how a fair
distribution should ideally look like. This, in turn, gives rise to a very natural and intuitive
measure for the demand for redistribution as the discrepancy between the perceived and the
desired level of inequality.
The conceptual framework is directly based on methods for measuring objective wage in-
equality. First, we thus note that, to measure objective wage inequality in some subpopulation
of size n, it is sufficient to observe the corresponding vector of wages:
y = {y(1), . . . , y(i), . . . , y(n)}, (1)
as most inequality indices are a function of y only. The measurement of subjective wage
inequality is a simple generalization in that the vector of wages now becomes a function of the
evaluation of these wages by a specific individual:
y(i) = {y(i)(1), . . . , y(i)(i), . . . , y(n)} (2)
Thus, subjective inequality may differ across individuals because individuals may have different
evaluations of occupational wages. The framework this way incorporates the feature that
inequality is in the eye of the beholder: individuals may hold widely different beliefs about
inequality. As a consequence, while objective inequality can be summarized by one inequality
measure only, subjective inequality is described by a distribution of inequality indices across
individuals.
The second step simply is to realize that individuals’ estimates of occupational wages
(discussed in section 2.1) can be used to approximate subjective wage distributions. More
specifically, the occupational wage estimates discussed in the preceding section are used to
construct the following two triples of information for each individual in the sample:
(y(i)abottom, y(i)
a
top, fbottom), and (3a)
(y(i)jbottom, y(i)jtop, fbottom), (3b)
where superscript a refers to actual (perceived) and j to just (ethical, desired) wage estimates,
respectively, and ybottom and ytop denotes an individual’s average wage estimate of the lower
and the upper part of the occupational distribution, respectively. The distinction between
perceived and fair wages is the final key characteristic of the framework: equation (3a) is used
6
to approximate an individual’s perceived distribution of occupational wages, while equation
(3b) approximates his or her imagination of the ethical wage distribution.
In both cases, the population of occupations is divided into two non-overlapping groups,
labelled ‘bottom’ and ‘top’. The different occupations for which individuals gave wage esti-
mates are then assigned to one of the two groups.4 Estimates of the two group-specific wages
are then computed as simple averages of the corresponding estimates of occupation-specific
wage estimates.5 Finally, the fraction of individuals belonging to the bottom group, fbottom,
is estimated from the occupational distribution in the sample using the International Stan-
dard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). Note that fbottom is the same for the actual and
the ethical wage distribution, and that it is fixed across individuals also. Importantly, these
numbers are sufficient to compute the Gini coefficient for both actual and ethical wages at
the individual level. In the simple case of two groups only, the Gini coefficient is given by the
following simple expression (as shown in Kuhn, 2009):
G(i)w = fbottom − qw(i)bottom, (4)
where w = a (w = j) again refers to the actual (ethical) wage distribution, and where qwbottom
equals the wage share of the bottom group. This quantity in turn is given by the following
expression:
q(i)wbottom =
(
y(i)wbottomfbottom
y(i)wbottomfbottom + y(i)wtop(1− fbottom)
)
(5)
Note that the denominator is equal to an individual’s overall actual and overall ethical wage
estimate, respectively. Descriptive statistics for the different components of equation (5) are
given in panels (a) and (b) of table 2. Because the group-specific wages are simple averages of
occupation-specific wage estimates, they basically mirror the pattern from figure 1. Because
the two population weights are the same for the actual and the desired wage distribution for
any given individual and also across different individuals, all differences between individuals
as regards their evaluation of wage inequality must be due to differences in their estimates of
occupational wages.6
Given a measure for both an individual’s perception of actual wage inequality as well as a
measure of what this individual considers as an acceptable level of inequality, it’s straightfor-
ward to compute the desired amount of redistribution. Specifically, in what follows, I use the
4Specifically, the three blue-collar occupations (shop assistant, unskilled worker, skilled worker) are assigned
to the bottom group and the remaining six occupations (doctor, judge, lawyer, minister, chairman, owner of a
factory) are assigned to the top group. See also table 1 and appendix A.
5For example, the wage of the bottom group (y(i)bottom) is computed as the simple average of i’s estimates
of the wages of a shop assistant, an unskilled worker, and a skilled worker.
6It is well known that the Gini coefficient based on grouped data will generally be lower than if based on
individual level data due to convexity of the Lorenz curve (e.g. Gastwirth and Glauberman, 1976). Also note
that one could easily rescale the Gini coefficient to the unit interval, simply by dividing the Gini coefficient
from equation (4) by fbottom. However, because I do not intend to make literal interpretations of the subjective
inequality measures and as there are no comparisons across different countries involved, I do not use this
adjustment. Moreover, the primary variable of interest is unaffected by any such rescaling.
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desired reduction in the perceived level of wage inequality as my main measure for the demand
for redistribution, multiplied by -1 to fit the intuition that higher values of the measure indicate
a higher demand for redistribution:
R(i) = −1 ·
[
G(i)j
G(i)a
− 1
]
=
[
1− G(i)
j
G(i)a
]
(6)
Because the population weights are fixed, the only reason why G(i)j and G(i)a can possibly
differ and thereby give rise to any demand for redistribution is because the desired wage share
of the bottom group differs from it’s perceived wage share, irrespective of the level of perceived
wage inequality.7 Moreover, R(i) has the characteristic that a higher perceived inequality
and a lower desired inequality, respectively, lead to a higher demand for redistribution ceteris-
paribus. Importantly however, it is exactly this feature of the measure that seems to perfectly
fit our own intuition about the demand for redistribution. Note that for most of the measures
used in the empirical literature such ceteris-paribus comparisons are not possible because they
confound these two dimensions.
4 Heterogenous Perceptions and Beliefs
Panel (c) of table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the different subjective inequality indices dis-
cussed in the preceding section. As expected, the average subjective Gini coefficient describing
individuals’ perceived wage distribution is positive on average (about 0.335) and remarkably
higher than the average Gini coefficient describing the desired wage distribution (which is equal
to about 0.229).
Table 2, panel (c)
It is also interesting to note that all individuals perceive at least some wage inequality and
that only a tiny fraction (about 0.4 percent) of all individuals judges absolute equality as their
desired wage distribution. The second number is probably somewhat surprising and it suggests
that absolutely equal wages across occupations is in general not judged as a fair distribution.
Consequently, individuals demand a positive and quantitatively significant amount of redistri-
bution on average. Average demand for redistribution equals 0.311, implying that individuals
want to decrease inequality with respect to wages by about one third, relative to the level of
inequality that they perceive to exist. Table 2 also shows the fraction of individuals exhibit-
ing a negative, null or positive demand for redistribution. Not surprisingly, an overwhelming
majority of individuals desires some positive amount of redistribution.
Figure 2
Panel (a) of figure 2 shows the joint distribution of the two subjective inequality measures.
This figure shows that there is pronounced heterogeneity not only in the beliefs that people
7I have re-run part of the analysis using the difference between the two inequality indices as a measure for
desired redistribution, i.e. using ∆G(i) = −1 · [G(i)j −G(i)a] as dependent variable. The results turn out to be
qualitatively the same (results not shown).
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hold, but also in the perceptions they have. Moreover, there is variation in the desired level
of inequality for any given level of perceived inequality. Further, it is also clear that most
individuals favor a level of occupational wage inequality that is somewhat lower than what
they actually perceive, as most of the points lie below the 45◦ line (indicating no demand for
redistribution at all).
Consequently, the resulting distribution of the demand for redistribution takes on positive
values for most individuals, as shown in panel (b) figure 2.8 However, there are also some
individuals with a value on the demand for redistribution that is larger than one and some
individuals with a negative value on this measure even. Closer inspection of the first case
reveals that a demand higher than one results for individuals who would like to overturn the
ranking of the two groups (however, there are only two observations where this happens). A
negative value for the demand for redistribution most often results from individuals’ desire
increase all wages and the wages of the top group to an even higher degree than the wages of
the bottom group (or vice versa), and not because they want to redistribute from the bottom
to the top group literally (i.e. holding overall wages constant).
Figure 3
Next, figure 3 shows the joint distribution of the demand for redistribution and the per-
ceived level of wage inequality as well as the joint distribution of the demand for redistribution
and the desired level of wage inequality. Interestingly, the simple bivariate correlation between
the demand for redistribution and the perceived wage inequality is essentially zero, whereas
the correlation between the redistribution measure and the desired wage inequality is negative
and very pronounced.9
4.1 The Anatomy of the Demand for Redistribution
Because I actually observe several wage estimates for most individuals in the sample, I can
compute some additional moments describing more specific features of subjective wage distri-
butions, analogous to the measures used by Osberg and Smeeding (2006). Let y(i)w denote
an individual’s vector of wage estimates for the nine different occupations (i.e. I exclude wage
estimates which refer to an individual’s coworkers), referring again to either actual (w = a)
or desired (w = j) wages. The following moments describe the tails of the distributions of
subjective wage estimates:
floor(i)w = min(y(i)w)/y(i)w, and (7a)
ceiling(i)w = max(y(i)w)/y(i)w, (7b)
8Figure 2 makes it also clear that it is perfectly appropriate to use standard linear regression models in this
case, as opposed to the conventional measures that have been analyzed in the literature so far. These measures
are most often of ordinal nature only and thus require more sophisticated (but also more difficult to interpret)
statistical models.
9A simple regression of the demand for redistribution on the first and second polynomial of the perceived
wage inequality yields an R-squared of 0.006 only. In contrast, regressing the redistribution measure on the first
two polynomials of the desired level of inequality gives an R-squared of 0.381.
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with y(i)w denoting an individual’s overall estimate with respect actual and ethical wages,
respectively. These two additional moments describe the lower and the upper tail of the actual
and the perceived wage distribution, respectively. Both of them are relative to an individual’s
overall wage estimate in order to make them comparable across individuals.
Table 2, panel (d)
Panel (d) of table 2 shows descriptive statistics for these additional moments. Individuals per-
ceive that the lowest wage (of the nine occupations) is about half their average wage estimate.
Looking at the other end of the distribution, the perceived wage ceiling is about 4.5 times
as large as the average wage estimate. Moreover, and consistent with what has already been
presented, the ethical floor is higher than the perceived floor on average and the ethical ceiling
is considerably lower than the perceived ceiling, respectively.
The empirical associations between the different subjective inequality measures can easily
be described using regression models. Specifically, I estimate the parameters of the following
models:10
Iwi = m
w
i γ + i, and Ri = m
w
i γ + i, (8)
where Iwi denotes the subjective inequality measures of an individual, Ri denotes her demand
for redistribution, and mwi denotes other moments describing the subjective wage distributions
as evaluated by this individual.
Table 3
Table 3 shows the resulting parameter estimates. The first two columns show that the
perceived level of wage inequality is, conditional on the estimate for the average actual wage,
driven by both the lower and the upper tail of the distribution of actual wage estimates.
Interestingly, the second column shows that, conditional on moments relating to the actual
wage distribution, the two additional variables that relate to the ethical distribution of wages
do not reach statistical significance. In the next two columns the desired level of inequality is
used as dependent variable. We see that both the lower and the upper tail of the corresponding
distribution of estimates are relevant predictors for the desired level of wage inequality again.
The fourth column adds moments of the actual wage distribution. Interestingly, and in contrast
to actual inequality, these additional regressors do explain some significant amount of variation
in the desired level of wage inequality. The final three columns of table 3 show results for the
demand for redistribution. Note that both moments of the actual and the desired occupational
wage distribution are, on their own, associated with the demand for redistribution. However,
the association is much stronger for the moments that relate to the ethical distribution of
wages. Moreover, if both actual and ethical moments are used as regressors, all four estimates
of interest turn out to be highly significant. In sum, the demand for redistribution appears to
10For the ease of comparison, all coefficients are fully standardized. That is, γˆ gives the predicted change in
the dependent variable in terms of its standard deviation resulting from a one standard deviation increase in
the corresponding regressor.
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be a function of both tails of the distribution of perceived wages as well as the distribution of
ethical wages.
5 Empirical Analysis
The main empirical analysis starts by looking at potential predictors of the demand for redis-
tribution, focusing mainly on variables that measure economic self-interest or perceptions and
normative beliefs related to the distribution of wages. Second, I study the empirical associa-
tion between the perceptions of inequality and the beliefs about the just distribution of wages,
respectively, and an individual’s support for redistribution by the state. Such an analysis may
yield important insights into the hypothesized link between perceptions and beliefs on the one
hand and political outcomes on the other hand. Third, I estimate the effect of the demand for
redistribution and other subjective inequality measures on individuals’ stated party preference,
thereby providing additional evidence on the potential feedback from norms and perceptions
to political outcomes.
5.1 Motives for Demanding Redistribution
Given the huge amount of heterogeneity in both inequality perceptions and normative beliefs, it
is not really evident whether individuals’ perceptions and beliefs have some structure at all. In
a first step, I therefore investigate different potential motives for demanding redistribution that
have been put forward in the literature. The first group of predictors consists of the following
factors: Financial self-interest (e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981), comparison income (Clark and
Oswald, 1996; Senik, 2005), and social mobility (Benabou and Ok, 2001; Piketty, 1995). In
the following, I will use family income, individuals’ justice evaluation of their coworkers’ wages
and a simple index of social mobility as the corresponding empirical measures.
The second group of regressors includes individuals’ perceptions of how wages are deter-
mined in reality and their normative beliefs with respect to the just distribution of wages
(subsumed under the vector beliefsi). There are two different variables describing individuals’
perceptions. The first variable measures whether people think that acquired skills or active
inputs, like educational attainment and personal effort, are in reality relevant for determining
pay, and the second variable measures the weight that people attach to ascribed skills or in-
puts beyond an individual’s control, like knowing the right people, in determining one’ wage.
Moreover, I include two variables that try to measure what are probably the most important
principles with respect to distributive justice, namely equity (or proportionality) and needs
(Dawes et al., 2007). I use several survey items to measure these concepts (see appendix A).
Additionally, I include a set of covariates that are likely correlated with potential un-
observed confounding variables like, for example, risk aversion. For example, I also include
individuals’ employment status, age and schooling as regressors. The statistical model thus
takes the following form:
Ri = β0 + self-interestiγ1 + beliefsiγ2 + controlsiβ + i, (9)
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where Ri is the demand for redistribution as given by equation (6). The vector self-interesti
contains the three variables describing motives for self-interested demand for redistribution
(logarithm of family income, the justice evaluation of coworkers’ wage, and a scale denoting
(past) social mobility). Perceptions of how wages are determined in reality and social beliefs
and norms regarding the fair distribution of wages are part of vector beliefsi. The third vector,
controlsi, includes all additional control variables.11. Estimates of the parameters contained in
γ1 and γ2 are shown in table 4.
Table 4
The first two models focus on self-interested motives only, with and without controlling for
background characteristics, respectively. The next two models focus on the effects of the
variables describing individuals’ beliefs and perceptions (again, with and without background
controls). Finally, both sets of regressors are included in the last three models and the ulti-
mate model additionally includes the interaction between log family income and one’s justice
evaluation to check whether the effect of income depends on the an individual’s assessment of
his or her wage.
The first row shows that, as expected, income has a negative and statistically significant
effect on the demand for redistribution. The corresponding parameter estimates range between
about -0.045 and -0.075. The effect of income is actually quite large in economic terms as
the parameter estimates imply an elasticity of the demand for redistribution with respect
to income of about -0.14 to about -0.24, if evaluated at the mean value of the dependent
variable. Nonetheless, the predicted average demand for redistribution for individuals with
highest income is still positive.12 Interestingly, the variable labelled ‘justice evaluation’ has a
large positive effect, i.e. individuals who think that they should earn more than they actually
do have a higher demand for redistribution. The model in the last column adds the interaction
term between the log of income and the justice evaluation to the set of regressors. Interestingly,
the interaction term turns out to be negative, implying that the effect of income is the more
negative for those individuals with the higher values on the justice evaluation. Contrary
to expectation, however, the effect of the mobility index turns out to be insignificant and
essentially zero in economic terms.
The next four rows show the estimated effect of individuals’ beliefs and perceptions. The
two belief variables, labelled needs and effort, both have the expected sign and quite strong
effects on the demand for redistribution across all specifications. A one standard deviation
increase in the belief that needs should be important in determining pay, for example, in-
creases the demand for redistribution by about 0.03 (which corresponds to a relative increase
11The full list of background controls is the following: Age (in years), a female dummy, educational attainment
(in years), the number of persons in the household, two dummy variables indicating employment and retirement
status, respectively, a dummy for living in an urban/suburban region, and a set of dummies for the state of
residence. Table B.1 provides summary statistics for these variables.
12For example, using the estimates from model shown in column (6), the average predicted demand for
redistribution is 0.287 for individuals in the highest income bracket. Although this number is clearly much lower
than the average demand of the poorest individuals in the sample (sample average of 0.416), these individuals
still have a positive demand for redistribution on average.
12
of about 9%). The belief in effort has the expected negative sign and, similarly, has also quite
a strong effect on the dependent variable. Increasing effort by one standard deviation results
in an increase of about -0.029 (corresponding to a relative decrease of about 9.5%). Turning
to individuals’ perceptions of how pay is actually determined, only one of the two included
variables, i.e. the perception that ‘acquired’ skills, has any statistical impact on the demand for
redistribution. Again, a hypothetical increase of one standard deviation leads to a predicted
decrease in the dependent variable of about 0.026, which corresponds roughly to a relative
decrease of 8.3%.
The results from table 4 yield a consistent picture: all models yield the same results qual-
itatively, whether background controls are included or not. Further, all regressors of interest
have the expected sign, except the index of mobility and the variable describing whether an
individual thinks that ascribed skills are important for getting ahead which are not statisti-
cally different from zero. In both cases, this seems to be a result from point estimates that are
essentially zero (and not because the precision of the estimates is low). Overall, these results
also fit well into the previous empirical literature (e.g. Corneo and Gru¨ner, 2002; Fong, 2001).
5.2 Support for the Welfare State
Although most individuals demand some equalization of occupational wages, it is not clear
whether this also implies that a majority of those individuals thinks that the government
should be doing something about it. Therefore, in order to provide some empirical evidence
on the link between norms and political outcomes, I regress a simple measure of individuals’
support for redistribution by the state on some of the subjective inequality measures that have
been discussed before (again, see appendix A again for the exact wording of the dependent
variable). I therefore run several regression models similar to equation (9), only that now
the support for redistribution by the state is the dependent variable and the demand for
redistribution Ri, or some other subjective inequality measure Iwi relating to either the actual
or the ethical occupational wage distribution, is the key regressor:
supporti = β0 +Riα+ self-interestiγ1 + beliefsiγ2 + controlsiβ + i, or (10a)
supporti = β0 + Iiα+ self-interestiγ1 + beliefsiγ2 + controlsiβ + i, (10b)
where supporti is a simple measure for individuals’ support for redistribution by the state.
Interest now shifts to parameter α which quantifies the effect of individuals’ subjective in-
equality perception on their propensity to support redistribution by the state. As shown in
the preceding section, the independent variables describing different motives for demanding
redistribution quite strongly correlate with Ri and Ii, respectively. Therefore, I additionally
show results where only the inequality measures show up as explanatory variables. However,
the background control variables are included as regressors throughout.
Table 5 shows the resulting estimates. The first panel (i.e. the first three columns) use
the demand for redistribution as key regressor, the second panel includes both actual and
ethical wage inequality instead. The first model of each panel includes only socio-economic
13
controls, the second model also includes the variables picking up self-interested motives for
redistribution, and the third model additionally includes beliefs and norms. We may first note
that there is considerable support for redistribution by the state on average (the average of
the dependent variable equals 3.78, on a scale ranging from 1 to 5).
Table 5
The first three columns use the demand for redistribution as main regressor. We see that the
demand for redistribution has a large positive and significant effect on individuals’ support for
redistribution by the state, i.e. people who desired a more equal distribution of occupational
wages tend to be more in favor of redistribution by the state. This holds true regardless of
the control variables that are included in the model, although the point estimate is somewhat
reduced by the inclusion of additional controls (only including background controls yields a
point estimate of 0.988, while additionally controlling for self-interested motives and beliefs
leads to a smaller point estimate of 0.904). The size of the effect turns out to be large in
substantive terms as the elasticity of the support for redistribution by the state with respect
to the demand for redistribution equals about 7.5% (100%[(0.314 · 0.904)/3.788]) if evaluated
at mean values (and using the point estimate of the third column).
Analogously, the remaining three columns use the two subjective inequality measures in-
stead of the demand for redistribution as main regressors. Again, we can see that individuals
with a high (low) level of perceived (desired) inequality are more favorable towards the state in-
tervention with respect to inequality. As before, the corresponding effects are large in economic
terms. For example, using the point estimates shown in column (6) yields an elasticity of the
support for redistribution by the state with respect to the perceived level of wage inequality of
about 23.5% (= 100%[(0.336 · 2.653)/3.788]). Similarly, the estimated elasticity with respect
to the ethical level of wage inequality equals about -18% (= [(0.229 · −2.987)/3.788]).
5.3 Party Identification
If individuals’ demand for redistribution really shapes government’s action towards inequality,
then we would also expect an association between the subjective inequality measures and
individuals’ preferences over political parties (assuming that the political parties have different
positions over redistributive policies). I therefore estimate the effect of inequality perception
and the demand for redistribution on individuals’ stated preference over different political
parties:
1(Partyi = j) = β0 +Riα+ self-interestiβ + beliefsiγ + controlsiδ + i, and (11a)
1(Partyi = j) = β0 + Iiα+ self-interestiβ + beliefsiγ + controlsiδ + i, (11b)
where the dependent variable 1(Partyi = j) is a dummy variable indicating whether individ-
ual i would vote for party j (see appendix A for details).13 The variables on the right-hand
13I have also re-estimated the same models using only those individuals who do state preference for any
political party. The results are qualitatively the same as the ones obtained from using all available observations
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side are exactly the same as before. For the ease of interpretation, I estimate the parame-
ters from equation (11b) by ordinary least squares instead of using a nonlinear model like,
for example, a probit. In the analysis, I only consider the four political parties that had
the largest share of votes at the time the survey was administered. These are the social-
democratic party (“Sozialdemokratische Partei O¨sterreichs”, SPO¨), the conservative Austrian
People’s Party (“O¨sterreichische Volkspartei”, O¨VP), the right-of-center Austrian Freedom
Party (“Freiheitliche Partei O¨sterreichs”, FPO¨), and the Green Party (“Die Gru¨nen”). Addi-
tionally, I also show results using a dummy variable indicating that an individual would not
vote for any political party at all as dependent variable because refraining from stating any
preference over political parties altogether may also be an interesting outcome. Note that the
sample size is somewhat reduced because of missing information on party preference for some
individuals: there remain 534 out of the original 707 observations.
Table 6
Estimation results are given in table 6. Panel (a) of table 6 shows estimates when only
baseline controls are included. Panel (b) shows estimates that also control for variables de-
scribing individuals’ financial self-interest and their perceptions and beliefs. As before, I show
bothh sets of results because subjective inequality measures and the demand for redistribution
are highly correlated.
Quite surprisingly, and in stark contrast to the results for individuals’ support for redis-
tribution by the state, all key parameters turn out to be statistically insignificant (the only
exception is a significant effect of the demand for redistribution on the probability of voting
for the conservative party). However, this effect also turns insignificant once beliefs and per-
ceptions are included as regressors. Moreover, the insignificance seems to be mainly a result
of small point estimates, and less so a result of imprecision of those estimates. For example,
the point estimate for the effect of the demand for redistribution on stated party preference
for the social-democratic party is 0.071, which yields a predicted change in the probability of
stating preference for the social-democratic party of 1.65 percentage points for a hypothetical
increase in the demand for redistribution of one standard deviation (which equals 0.233).14
Overall, none of the estimated parameters is significantly different from zero, except the
effect of the demand for redistribution on the probability of identifying oneself with the con-
servative party (panel (a), third column). Second, most effects are quite small in substantive
terms. Thus, in most cases, the lack of statistical significance is a result of small point esti-
mates, and not so much a result of large standard errors. It thus appears as if concerns about
wage inequality - although such concerns are clearly present, as shown in the preceding sections
- is not an important determinant of individuals’ party identification.
This result is somewhat surprising, given that the preceding section has shown a substantial
and significant association between subjective inequality measures and individuals’ propensity
(results not shown).
14The same calculation for the largest effect, i.e. the effect running from the demand for redistribution on
the probability of stating preference for the conservative party, yields a predicted change of slightly more than
three percentage points.
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to support redistribution by the state.15 One potential explanation for this missing association
between preferences over redistribution and party identification is that the positions of the two
big parties (O¨VP, SPO¨) have converged to a significant degree, at least as regards social policy
(Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2005). This convergence in turn may at least in part be driven by the
underlying political institutions (Iversen and Soskice, 2006).
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I study subjective estimates of wage inequality and the demand for redistribution
in Austria, using a simple empirical framework that mainly builds on individuals’ estimates
of both actual and ethical wages of several specific occupations. This framework explicitly
distinguishes between individuals’ perceptions and normative beliefs as regards the distribution
of wages, which then leads to a natural measure of the demand for redistribution as the desired
reduction in the perceived level of wage inequality.
A first key result of this paper is that most individuals would prefer a distribution of
occupational wages that is more equal than the distribution they perceive to actually exist,
and this desired reduction in overall wage inequality is driven by both a desire to increase wages
at the bottom and to decrease wages at the top of the distribution. Further, and in line with
previous evidence, self-interested motives do explain part of the variation in the demand for
redistribution, but perceptions of inequality and normative beliefs with respect to inequality
appear to be at least as important. As expected, the various subjective inequality measures
in turn are substantially significant predictors of individuals’ support for redistribution by the
state. Individuals with a high demand for redistribution, with a high level of perceived wage
inequality or with a low level of ethical wage inequality tend to support intervention by the
government in order to reduce existing inequalities. However, there is no substantial association
between subjective inequality indices the individuals’ party identification. Although this last
result is somewhat surprising at first, it may simply reflect that the main political parties hold
more or less the same positions as regards redistribution.
Finally, the comparison between Austria and analogous results for Switzerland shows some
striking similarities and differences between the two countries. Although suggestive, such a
comparison remains highly speculative. Nonetheless, this comparison suggests that interesting
insights may be gained from applying the conceptual framework used in this study to a broader
set of countries.
15It also contrasts strongly with analogous results for Switzerland, where subjective inequality measures and
the demand for redistribution are substantially important predictors for individuals’ party preferences (Kuhn,
2009). Interestingly, this difference in the predictive power of subjective inequality indices as regards party
identification is the only notable difference between the results for Austria and Switzerland.
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Table 1: Subjective estimates of occupational wages
Actual wage Just wage
(a) Bottom group:
Unskilled worker 1, 170.37 1, 411.62
(304.40) (409.06)
Shop assistant 1, 263.61 1, 544.12
(304.33) (412.86)
Skilled worker 1, 646.91 1, 887.64
(423.40) (484.87)
(b) Top group:
Doctor 5, 960.82 5, 365.46
(5, 222.48) (3, 729.71)
Judge 6, 772.14 5, 481.61
(4, 222.56) (3, 090.27)
Lawyer 7, 892.25 5, 944.27
(5, 666.69) (4, 129.51)
Minister 10, 083.33 6, 296.60
(5, 335.44) (3, 418.85)
Chairman 10, 983.98 7, 690.27
(8, 889.57) (6, 270.98)
Owner factory 13, 574.40 9, 982.49
(12, 619.85) (9, 797.28)
(c) Respondent’s occupation
Coworker 1, 843.64 2, 074.53
(1, 060.26) (1, 209.94)
Notes: Table entries are average estimates of perceived (actual) and
desired (just) wages (in e , gross per month). Standard deviations are
given in parentheses. All numbers are based on 707 observations except
coworkers’ wage estimates which are based on 653 and 658 observations,
respectively. See also appendix A.
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Table 2: Subjective inequality measures and the demand for redistribution
Mean Standarddeviation
(a) Perceived wage distribution
Wage, overall 2, 318.102 734.675
Wage, bottom group 1, 360.298 283.893
Wage, top group 9, 211.153 5, 277.663
Population share, bottom group 0.878 −
(b) Desired wage distribution
Wage, overall 2, 246.297 624.699
Wage, bottom group 1, 614.461 389.194
Wage, top group 6, 793.449 3931.714
Population share, bottom group 0.878 −
(c) Inequality and redistribution
Gini coefficient, actual wage distribution 0.335 0.120
1(Actual Gini = 0) 0.000 0.000
Gini coefficient, desired wage distribution 0.229 0.110
1(Desired Gini = 0) 0.004 0.065
Demand for redistribution 0.311 0.233
1(Demand < 0) 0.047 0.211
1(Demand = 0) 0.033 0.178
1(0 < Demand < 1) 0.914 0.281
1(Demand = 1) 0.004 0.065
1(Demand > 1) 0.003 0.053
(d) Additional moments
Perceived floor 0.508 0.132
Ethical floor 0.626 0.135
Perceived ceiling 6.536 3.079
Ethical ceiling 4.548 2.701
Notes: All table entries are based on 707 observations. All wage estimates in panel
(a) and (b) are given in e . All variables are defined in the main text. 1(·) denotes
the indicator function.
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Figure 1: Estimates of occupational wages
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Notes: The triangles correspond to individuals’ average estimates of actual (perceived) occupational
wages. The circles shows average estimates of desired (just, ethical) occupational wages. The number
of observations equals 707 except the estimate for coworkers’ wage, which is based on 653 (658)
observations only (see also table 1).
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Figure 2: Subjective inequality measures
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Notes: The figure in panel (a) shows the joint distribution of the two subjective wage inequality
measures, as defined in equation (4) in the text. The thin line corresponds to the 45◦ line, and the
two dotted lines denote the two sample means. The dashed line shows the nonparametric regression
function from a regression of the desired inequality on the perceived inequality measure. The figure
is based on 707 observations. Panel (b) shows the distribution of the demand for redistribution, as
defined in equation (6). The dotted line shows the kernel density estimate with gaussian kernel and
bandwidth of about 0.052. Seven observations (with a value lower than -0.25) have been excluded
for drawing the graph.
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Figure 3: Redistribution versus subjective wage inequality
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Notes: The figure at the top (at the bottom) shows the demand for redistribution versus the perceived
(the desired) wage inequality. All three variables are defined in the text (equations (4) and (6)).
The dotted line shows the predicted demand for redistribution from a regression of the demand for
redistribution on the first and second polynomial of the perceived wage inequality and desired wage
inequality, respectively. Three observations (with a value of the demand for redistribution ≤ -0.5)
have been excluded in drawing the graphs.
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A Variable Definitions
A.1 Dependent Variables
Occupational wages:
Individuals were asked two questions about occupational wages (the wording is taken from the
source questionnaire of the ISSP):
1. “We would like to know what you think people in these jobs actually earn. Please write
how much you think they actually earn each month (before taxes and social security
contributions). Many people are not exactly sure about this, but your best guess will be
close enough.”
2. “Next, what do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid. How much do you think
they should earn each month (before taxes and social security contributions), regardless
of what they actually earn.”
Individuals were then asked to estimate actual and just wages of people working in the following
ten jobs (in the same order as in the survey):
1. “A skilled worker in a factory” (skilled worker)
2. “A doctor in general practice” (doctor)
3. “The chairman of a large national company” (chairman)
4. “A lawyer” (lawyer)
5. “A shop assistant in a big store” (shop assistant)
6. “The owner–manager of a large factory” (owner factory)
7. “A judge in the constitutional court” (judge)
8. “An unskilled worker in a factory” (unskilled worker)
9. “A cabinet minister in the Federal Government” (minister)
10. “Your own occupation” (coworker)
The phrasing in parentheses is the corresponding label used in the text, figures and tables. All
variables computed from these occupational wage estimates are discussed in detail in sections
3 and 4 in the main text.
Support for the welfare state / redistribution by the state:
Individuals’ support for the welfare state is measured by the following survey question: “Do
you agree or disagree? It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences
in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.” The variable has
been rescaled such that higher numbers indicate more agreement with the statement. Possible
answer categories range from a scale of 5 (“strongly agree”) to 1 (“strongly disagree”).
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Stated party preferences:
Individuals were asked whether they feel affiliated with one of the political parties in Austria
(i.e. they were asked for which party they would vote if there were elections at the time of the
interview). The four relevant parties in the year of the interview were the following:
1. The social democrats (“Sozialdemokratische Partei O¨sterreichs”, SPO¨)
2. The conservatives (“O¨sterreichische Volkspartei”, O¨VP)
3. The right of center liberals (“Freiheitliche Partei O¨sterreichs”, FPO¨)
4. The green party (“Die Gru¨nen”).
In the empirical analysis, I additionally look at individuals who explicitly stated that they
would not vote for any party.
A.2 Independent variables
Family income:
Unfortunately, family income is only available as a discrete variable with only a few different
values. The midpoints of these intervals are used as values on the variable.
Justice evaluation of own earnings:
This variable corresponds to the ratio of just and actual wage for individual i’s coworkers,
that is (y(i)dCoworker/y(i)
a
Coworker), where y(i)
a
Coworker denotes i’s estimate of what people in his
occupation actually earn and y(i)dCoworker denotes what individual i thinks that people in his
occupation ought to earn.
Mobility:
I use the difference between the following two scales for constructing a simple index of (upward)
mobility:
1. “In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend
to be toward the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to bottom. Where would
you put yourself on this scale?”
2. “And ten years ago, where did you fit in then?”
The index of social mobility is measured as position today minus position ten years ago.
Needs:
This variable is also a simple rating scale constructed from two different variables: “In deciding
how much people ought to earn, how important should each of these things be, in your opinion?”
1. “What is needed to support your family.”
2. “Whether the person has children to support.”
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Effort:
A scale made up of five different questions: “In deciding how much people ought to earn, how
important should each of these things be, in your opinion?”
1. “How much responsibility goes with the job.”
2. “The number of years spent in education and training.”
3. “Whether the job requires supervising others.”
4. “How well he or she does the job.”
5. “How hard he or she works at the job.”
Ascribed skills:
Underlying this scale are two questions related to whether ascribed characteristics are im-
portant for getting ahead in life: “We have some questions about opportunities for getting
ahead.”
1. “How important is coming from a wealthy family?”
2. “Knowing the right people?”
Acquired skills:
This scale is generated from two items. The two items reflect to what extent people think
that acquired skills are important in determining one’s pay: “We have some questions about
opportunities for getting ahead.”
1. “Do you agree or disagree? In Austria, people get rewarded for their effort.”
2. “In Austria, people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills.”
Perception of conflicts:
Another scale, constructed from five different questions about the perception of different con-
flict in society: “In all countries, there are differences or even conflicts between different social
groups. In your opinion, in Austria how much conflict is there between...”
1. “Poor people and rich people?”
2. “The working class and the middle class?”
3. “Management and workers?”
4. “People at the top of society and people at the bottom?”
5. “Young people and older people?”
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B Additional Tables and Figures
Table B.1: Summary statistics
Mean Standard
deviation
A. Self interest
Family income 1, 840.732 674.853
ln(family income) 7.429 0.462
Justice evaluation (coworkers) 1.190 0.539
Social mobility 0.099 1.361
B. Perceptions and Norms
Needs 3.438 0.929
Effort 3.998 0.513
Aquired skills 3.283 0.856
Ascribed skills 3.343 0.958
Perception of conflicts 2.148 0.535
C. Additional controls
Female: Yes = 1 0.569 0.496
Age (years) 48.873 16.699
Education (years) 10.716 2.854
Household size 2.579 1.202
Employed: Yes = 1 0.480 0.484
Retired: Yes = 1 0.315 0.450
Living in urban/suburban region: Yes = 1 0.553 0.498
Regional dummies:
Tyrol 0.059 0.237
Salzburg 0.086 0.281
Upper Austria 0.143 0.350
Carinthia 0.103 0.305
Styria 0.143 0.350
Burgenland 0.044 0.205
Lower Austria 0.184 0.388
Vienna 0.218 0.413
Number of observations 707
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